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The 'Dependency' Case against Aid
Assessment of the impact of the aid system on any
country inevitably involves a large element of
judgement. Where a significant transfer of resources
has occurred, it is unlikely that in any immediate sense
the recipient nation could be poorer than it would
have been without aid, although particular groups of
people could be worse off (eg where massive food aid
undermines the local farmer's market). However, the
attack on aid from both left and right rests largely on
the view that the aid system is a crucial negative
influence on the recipient's policy regime, so
undermining economic performance that any benefits
of resource transfer are more than offset by lower
growth, or more unequal income distribution.
Even a narrowly defined assessment of performance is
difficult. The nature of the economies in question is
such that development tasks are not easy. Some
projects succeed, but many fail. In the case of
Bangladesh, for example, performance appears weak
as compared to monumental need, and little progress
has been made in uplifting the mass of the poor.
However, despite the meagre legacy with which
Bangladesh was initially endowed, the direst pre-
dictions have not been realised; since 1974, famine has
been avoided, post-war reconstruction carried through
with the support of the international community, and
modest growth in per capita output achieved. No
economic miracle occurred in South Asia - but
perhaps in the Bangladesh case anything better than
bare survival is a little miraculous.
The outcome is ambiguous. Desperately low incomes,
political problems, and the weak economic base can
readily support a pessimistic view of the future. How
far is aid much help, or how far is it part of the
problem?
In working on Bangladesh! collaborated with Koen De Wilde, and
drew on his considerable experience of the aid process in
Bangladesh in this paper.
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Large resources, including food, have been transferred
to Bangladesh through aid, and many aid projects
have been productive. The most compelling case
against aid, however, derives less from the failure of
particular aid projects than from the view that overall
aid was a significant, even determining, influence in
pushing the economy in directions inimical to long-
term development, frustrating an alternative develop-
ment option that promised a much better performance.
This has been argued with great vigour by Rahman
Sobhan [1982], a member of the Planning Commission
in the early days of Bangladesh, a period of massive
aid mobilisation. His views suggest a deep frustration
with the outcome of that experience.
His radical critique of the aid system may be
summarised as follows:
It creates a powerful group of intermediaries (aid
compradors, professionals, state officials), whose
income is directly dependent on - and who have
achieved considerable wealth from - aid flows, both
by open and legal contractual arrangements and
illicitly.
Both because of the powerful interests thus created
and because aid provides an easy option, difficult
policy decisions are avoided, and appropriate steps are
not taken to generate surpluses domestically to
finance development and to restructure the economy
to provide the basis for a less aid-dependent growth.
Aid tying generates import-biased growth,
frustrating the development of local capacity.
Aid has placed undue influence in the hands of
donors; the abridgement of national sovereignty
inherent in this degree of aid dependence is
objectionable per se, and the influence has been
inappropriately used.
Donors might feel that aspects of this argument place
them in a double bind: damned if they do and damned
if they don't. Thus the aid system is criticised for
promoting parasitic intermediates; yet when donors
mention corruption, or press for institutional reform,
they step beyond the legitimate bounds of their role!
Likewise, donors are accused of using imported inputs
(including expensive consulting services); but when
use is made of local institutions and consultants they
are criticised as an aid-dependent, privileged élite.
However, the systematic critique of aid rests less on its
observed impact than on a counterfactual view of the
alternatives which might have emerged in its absence.
Here, we find a superficial similarity between critical
positions from the left (a 'moderate' exemplar being
Griffin's paper in this Bulletin) and Bauerian market-
oriented arguments; both offer a strong, if differing,
view regarding superior development paths, which
would be available but for aid. Ultimately, the validity
of such critiques rests not so much on the observations
regarding the existing structure as on the feasibility of
the alternative programmes envisaged, in terms both
of their economic potential and of their political
sustainability, assuming a less dominant aid system.
For Bangladesh, Sobhan's counterfactual alternative
is more self-reliant development, with vigorous
policies to enhance and diversify exports; to substitute
for imports; to reform the land tenure system; to
'socialise production planning and distribution of the
grain surplus'; to raise savings, and to mobilise other
budgetary resources for investment; to reduce
subsidies to the better-off; and to increase domestic
capacity utilisation through purposeful management
to raise production, rather than aid flows. Externally,
a shift in trade from the West towards the South and
East is favoured.
A strong role is envisaged for the state, but geared to
more thorough institutional change and development
mobilisation than currently. Aid is seen as thwarting
such an option, by supporting established interests
and providing incentives to the state to pursue
different goals.
Such radical criticism is the obverse to the geo-
political defence of Western aid that justifies such
expenditures as a means of combating the risks of
radical change. In both cases aid is seen as playing a
potentially decisive role in determining the domestic
political outcome. The desirability of the aid-
dependent outcome would depend, in turn, on the
degree to which aid (a) pre-empts the need for radical
change by supporting more gradual, but nevertheless
real, solutions to social problems, or (b) merely
bolsters opposition to change, as claimed by left
criticism. However, the rather flabby, parasitic,
bureaucratic structure, seen by the critics as the
outcome of the aid relationship, would seem unlikely
to provide an effective opposition to powerful forces
in favour of social change, if they emerged.
For some donors who have supported social change
and poverty alleviation programmes, left criticism
may appear particularly damaging. In Bangladesh the
'like-minded donors', a significant segment of the aid
community, have recognised the need for rural social
change. Some programmes have had a measure of
success in delivering income to target groups, but so
far aid programmes have proved ineffective vehicles
for rural social change; often, access to benefits
reflects existing inequalities [see de Vylder and
Asplund 19781. However, the origin of rural inequality
is surely not to be found in the aid programme; and it is
far from evident that there was much indigenous
impetus for radical social change for aid to thwart.2
Whether the crises which would have been engendered
in the absence of aid would have provoked a radical
alternative is (legitimate) speculation; however, the
costs of crisis are far from speculative, and include
deaths from famine.
The free market anti-aid case, associated above all
with Bauer [1971, 1981, 1984], shares part of the left
vision of the aid system as underwriting a parasitic
bureaucracy, leading to inefficient economicdecisions
and inappropriate subsidisation. However, the
counterfactual alternative here is a system with a small
public sector, less government involvement in the
economy, and prices more reflective of true scarcities.
In particular, it is argued that an economy with less aid
would have a more competitive exchange rate, and a
domestic incentive system more conducive to export-
led growth, generating non-agricultural employment
and a sustainable growth path for the balance of
payments. As compared with that option, the aid
system might be seen as funding the growth of a
bureaucratic apparatus which is a prime source of
market distortions.
Against this view, those parts of the aid community,
such as USAID, which promote free-market solutions
argue that aid can be, and has been, used to promote
policy reforms to reduce market 'distortions' resulting
from past public policy (eg in relation to fertiliser
marketing and pricing). Whatever the merits or
weaknesses of laissez faire as an economic strategy,
why should it be more likely without aid? More
plausibly, the absence of aid would result in neither a
rationally planned economy, nor 'undistorted' laissez
faire, but a nastier, less effective and poorer version of
existing systems. Conversely, in Bangladesh, as in
many very poor countries, even substantial aid is
2
'The income distribution effects of the aid have largely been
negative in that most of the aid has failed to reach the poorest
groups of society; this has, however, rather been the fault of the
domestic economic, political and social structure than of the aid per
se' [de Vylder and Asptund, 1978:56].
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unlikely to prove sufficient for development; but it
may be necessary for the avoidance of disaster.3
This judgment hardly offers two cheers for aid. This is
because the economic and political future of
Bangladesh is inherently problematic, so that the
effectiveness and realism of alternative policy regimes
- and the impact of aid upon any given regime - are
subjects of legitimate debate. However, the practical
policy issue is not 'aid or no aid'. It is: given aid, how
can the aid system be improved? Elements of validity
in anti-aid polemics do point to reforms.
The Administrative Costs of Aid
Aid has developed from a transitory phenomenon
involving a few donors in any given country, to an
elaborate and virtually permanent system, involving
very many agencies in the economies of most poor
countries. For Bangladesh and a number of least
developed economies of sub-Saharan Africa, aid
looms large in the public development budget and,
particularly in the recent years of international crisis,
has provided balance-of-payments support. Many
public investments occur only if aid finance is
available, and even the operation of existing facilities
is contingent upon donor support for recurrent import
requirements. Alongside the financial involvement,
there is a substantial human presence: technical
advisers, resident aid missions, visiting teams.
The importance of aid finance and the pervasiveness
of the aid presence lends credibility to the critics who
blame aid for major failings in domestic policy. This
contrasts, however, with the donors' evident
frustration at their failure to influence local policy,
and the continual searching after new forms of policy
leverage and 'dialogue'. To many donors, the claim
that they decisively influence local policy has a hollow
ring.
Yet both donors (who feel they have too little
influence) and critics (who feel that donors have too
great an effect) may be right. Aid has an important
impact on the local policy-making and administrative
system. Some consequences are the negative if
unintended outcomes of aid procedures. Thus a strong
impact of aid on policy and administrative per-
formance may be consistent with correct donor
'The precise contribution of aid to development in Bangladesh is
very difficult to measure. The role of aid cannot be assessed simply
by apportioning t a share of the credit for improvements or of
blame for the lack thereof in the Bangladesh economy. Even in
Bangladesh, where aid accounts for such a large proportion of
development expenditure, there are both external and domestic
forces operating which are beyond the immediate control of the
donors.
1f all aid to Bangladesh had been eliminated, the most probable
outcome would have been further deterioration and massive
starvation' [Ehrhardt 1983:41, 43-44].
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perceptions of their own impotence in promoting
policy change.
Administrative capacity is as scarce a resource as
capital or foreign exchange, but it is more difficult to
supplement from outside. However, aid can place
great demands on scarce administrative resources, and
can only too easily confuse the decision-making
process and contribute to atrophy of responsibility.
The large numbers of donors and the diversity of their
aproaches imposes an enormous burden on recipient
administrations. Bangladesh has more donors than
most countries, but the order of magnitude is not very
different from other heavily aided countries, such as
Tanzania or Kenya, and the problems faced are quite
typical. Over 1971-82, 35 bilateral donors participated
in the Bangladesh aid programme. In 1981-82, there
were 24 such countries (including 14 members of the
OECD), six multilateral aid agellcies (the Asian
Development Bank, IDA, IFAD, the Islamic
Development Bank, OPEC, and EEC), 16 UN
specialised agencies, and over 100 foreign-based
NGOs.
Organisation of the donor varies a. great deal.
Important variations are:
- The extent to which the head office delegates
authority to the field office. Most donors are quite
centralised, delaying planning and implementation.
- Staffing of the local office, which varies from a
one-person bureau to USAID, with 35 staff members.
Most donors opt for an administrative office staffed
with aid-managers, with technical specialists located
in the projects and programmes. If advice is needed,
these experts are called in, which can confuse their
roles and place them in an awkward position vis-à-vis
the local authorities to whom they are responsible.
- Among bilateral donors, the position of the
ministry or agency responsible for aid in the national
bureaucracy of the donor country, and of the local
office in relation to the embassy, varies.
Throughout the project cycle - from identification,
through design, appraisal, approval, and imple-
mentation, to monitoring and evaluation - donor
practice varies from agency to agency. It is difficult for
the local official to develop a command over such
procedural diversity (although he often has a good
knowledge of the substantive local difficulties of
implementation). The problem is compounded in
multi-donor projects, operating under a variety of
procurement procedures, legal provisions, equipment
designs, etc.
The average length of stay of the donor representatives
is only three years or so. The same applies for project
experts. In recipient ministries and in many projects,
there is also frequent change in local personnel. Thus
the possibilities of building up a body of knowledge
and a set of working relationships around the aid
programme is limited. Lack of staff continuity and
clearly delegated authority also make it difficult to
locate responsibility for the success or failure of
projects among either donor or local staff; this reduces
incentives, job satisfaction, and the likelihood that
promotion - or demotion - could be related to the
eventual outcome of the programme.
Most countries try to lend coherence to complex aid
programmes by channelling aid through one ministry,
responsible for coordination of both the various
donor sources and the spending agencies. However,
the size of many programmes makes it difficult to
maintain tight central control without erecting
excessive bureaucratic constraints which would
themselves unduly block implementation. Moreover,
a coordinating agency will rarely have sufficient
capacity to establish or enforce tight aid priorities. An
official in the relevant coordinating ministry typically
takes responsibility for liaison with one or more
agencies and is unlikely to have the authority or
knowledge to assert a view over the range of sectoral
interests represented in a donor's project portfolio.
Although one ministry plays a key coordinating role,
initiative in the promotion of projects is located
throughout the government machinery. To enhance
the possibilities of financing their own projects, the
implementing agencies in many cases maintain
intensive direct relations with donor representatives.
The personalities of top officials in ministries and
agencies play an important role in the success of the
resulting lobbying process.
In this context, unsurprisingly, aid coordination by
the recipient government is often seen by donors as
inadequate. In part, this is a problem of technical
coordinating capacity, dependent upon the avail-
ability and continuity of technical manpower. In part,
it results from the formal powers of the coordinating
authority and its location in the government structure.
On the donor side, there is a commitment to co-
ordinate in principle. But it is tempered by the desire to
accelerate programme implementation, and to work
with particular parts of the system in the pursuit of
objectives attractive to the particular agency.
Thus, whatever the technical capacity and formal
controls, and despite agreement about the virtues of
coordination, there is often an interest on both sides to
by-pass or pre-empt the structure of control. This is
neither surprising nor reprehensible. For the dynamic
and astute manager, central control is often yet
another external of formal authority; the informal
structure of power and status provides particular
managers and agencies with a real autonomy from
coordinating controls.
At least part of the administrative weakness of which
donors complain results from the demands of the aid
programme itself. While there is no way to establish
conclusively the impact of aid on the administrative
structure, there is no evidence that the donors have
addressed the question in any specific fashion. Even
where donors perceive the problem, their behaviour is
strongly influenced by the needs of their 'own' projects
and programmes. Ultimately, each donor seeks to
create the best conditions for its funded activities,
without much regard for the overall effects.
Certainly, as currently administered, aid often
imposes an enormous administrative burden. Too
many foreign missions visit,4 too many projects are
negotiated, too many files have to be moved and
approved - without sufficient recognition of the costs
of all this in terms of demands placed on limited
administrative capacity. Donors might consider how
the effectiveness of their own governments would be
affected if their top financial and economic
administrators had to devote a good. part of the
working day to placating external financial agencies.
Faced with bottlenecks in the administrative system,
donors seek ways to facilitate implementation by
developing their own connections with key personnel
in the system, by training manpower for their 'own'
projects, and in some cases by financing local costs for
their projects. Also, many use their own technical
assistance personnel to facilitate the drawing down of
project funds or the smooth flow of commodity
imports. The pattern of implementation increasingly
reflects the ad hoc decisions of the several donor
agencies, impeding rational economic coordination.
The great importance of aid as a government financial
source, along with the multiplicity of aid agencies,
goals and criteria, adds a complex dimension to public
decision-making which in itself stands in the way of
effective coordination within government. The energy
expended in meeting the detailed and varied demands
of the many donors might otherwise have been used to
address the coherence of the government's programme
in terms of its own goals.
Import tying is an additional source of administrative
difficulty. It increases the cost of aided projects; it adds
The author recently led a mission for an international agency to one
small least-developed country, only to find a mission in place from a
sister agency with essentially the same terms of reference. On
completing the mission I left only to encounter a third mission with
overlapping interests from yet another agency.
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to the complexity of procurement procedures; and it
influences implementation priorities, as what is
available from the 'tying' donor may not coincide with
the requirements of priority projects.
Thus, while donors frequently express frustration with
the ineffectivenes of government and autonomous
institutions as implementing agencies, the burden of
aid management and the complexities this introduces
into the administrative process are an important part
of the problem. Aid programmes themselves become
both an incorrect influence on the administrative
structure and a source of institutional proliferation.
Donors could reduce the hidden administrative costs
of aid by strengthening their representation in the
recipient countries: by increasing staff, raising levels of
technical competence, and extending the duration of
postings. Aid administration could then be decentra-
lised, allowing local offices a high degree of autonomy
in adjusting to local conditions and reducing the flow
of visiting 'experts'. In the case of the World Bank, for
example, far too high a proportion of its staff is
located in Washington.
When aid is the major source of public investment
finance, poor control or coordination of aid by the
recipient government implies that the overall
development programme is in turn poorly co-
ordinated. Some might argue that, since the aid
agencies insist on a high standard of project appraisal,
a lack of coordination does not matter much.
However, projects are by their nature localised and
temporary. Moreover, project finance is limited,
sometimes being available only for capital costs
and/or import costs. The project design/appraisal!
approval processes are unlikely, therefore, to enable
either the donor or the particular implementing
agency to take account of the interrelationship
between the project and future macroeconomic
resource constraints, either on non-aid-financed local
costs or on future recurrent costs.
Several donors, including the Bank, have responded
sensibly to the ongoing financial crisis in sub-Saharan
Africa by shifting emphasis to programme and import
support (and rehabilitation). Many, however, still
favour import-tied capital investment projects. These
mean that aid can be utilised only to expand
productive capacity in an economy which lacks the
foreign exchange to utilise existing plant, and often
even to maintain it.
Management at the project level also raises complex
resource allocation issues. A powerful and well-
organised donor can insist, for 'its' project, on
standards of management higher than those generally
feasible in the economy; but then either scarce
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management resources are pre-empted for the aided
project, at the cost of others; or the prescribed
management standards are not met, to the frustration
of the donor; or the donor must supply comprehensive
project management, hoping to build local managerial
competence during the project through training and
counterpart programmes. However, islands of activity
with differing management styles (and, possibly,
incentive systems) are difficult to integrate into the
overall administrative structure. The transition from
donor to local management has often not been very
successful.
The need to achieve acceptable levels of management
within a given project is a source of one of the
paradoxes of the aid process. Institutions, such as the
World Bank, criticise bureaucratisation in principle,
but promote it in practice, by elaborating exacting
managerial and technical manpower requirements to
ensure project success. This results in increasingly
complex bureaucratic structures, and the ad hoc
proliferation of institutions to meet the requirements
of aided projects.
Many of the difficulties of project management arise
because of the legitimate desire of donors to place a
time limit on their involvement, passing on the project
to local hands so that it can be integrated into the local
institutional structure. Of course, the involvement of
the donor agency in the economy is not temporary, so
that after project 'completion' it moves on to finance
new projects, even while projects previously financed
go into decline. This is because initial project design
failed to meet the necessary conditions for local
operation and maintenance. As a result, there is a
subsequent proliferation of 'rehabilitation' projects,
or finance of 'new' projects doing once again what had
been attempted earlier.
In some cases the realistic solution is to accept that
project objectives can only be achieved with long-term
donor involvement, and to take advantage of that
recognition to enhance continuity of technical
support. This is a sensible approach to agricultural
research in Africa, for example, where continuity of
professional manpower is particularly desirable, but
where such a need cannot be met through local
staffing.
A realistic view of the technical and managerial
requirements of a project might also reduce the need
for staff with high levels of formal qualifications, for
example by utilising more fully knowledge existing in
the local economy. The best local farmers may have
more appropriate know-how than the 'expert' with
much greater formal training.
Some aspects of donors' practice reflect their
economic interests (notably import tying) or laws,
making rigidity understandable. Many other aspects,
however, reflect little more than administrative
convenience, given established donor procedures. At
least donors, who press recipients to reform, should
try to standardise and simplify their own procedures,
particularly where these reflect inertia or convenience
rather than economic interest or doctrine.
Policy Dialogue
Only if aid were allocated randomly or automatically
might it not influence domestic policy formulation.
Given that the decisions of donors to provide more aid
or less, or in one form or another, will be influenced by
a view of policy requirements and effectiveness, there
will be an incentive, even if implicit, to conform to
donors' views. There is, however, a range of
possibilities regarding the possible influence of aid on
policy. At one extreme, the influence might be totally
implicit, with donors' desires unstated and no
conditions attached. At the other extreme is the strict
conditionality of an IMF programme, where failure to
meet precise, agreed policy conditions leads to an
interruption in the flow of funds.
Insofar as aid is tied to projects, policy conditionality
may be inherent in the choice and design of the project.
Beyond this, conditions may be negotiated related to
the use of policy instruments which can be argued to
affect project performance, even if they are outside the
project. Thus the donor could conceive of using the
funding of a particular project as a level to achieve
desired policy changes, with implications extending
well beyond the project boundaries.
The wish to influence policy has grown as a result of
the perception that many projects fail, however well
designed, because of an inappropriate policy environ-
ment (eg an overvalued exchange rate). This concern
has become particularly acute in relation to many
African countries where extended economic crisis is
perceived to require thoroughgoing policy reform.
Hence there has been a growing donor interest in
influencing government policy on a broad range of
issues. Short of strict conditionality, that process is
described as 'policy dialogue' - somewhat euphe-
mistically, because the donors intend to improve
recipient policy without much intention of critically
examining relevant aid procedures and other donor
policies. Understandably, donors may not wish to
publicise their own mistakes; but it might encourage a
more open and flexible discussion of policy if failings
on both sides were laid on the table with equal
frankness. For example, in 1982 the World Bank
mounted a substantial study of agricultural sector
policy in Tanzania, and subsequently sought a policy
dialogue with the Tanzanians regarding their
conclusions. However, the Bank's study lacked a
critical examination either of its own or of other
donors' performance, at project level or in policy
advice. Yet during the 1970s donors played a crucial
role in the Tanzanian development programme. A
more balanced approach would not only allow for
better communication, but would also reduce the risk
that donors will not learn lessons for their own aid
policies from the poor performance of some African
economies.
The other possible virtue of true dialogue might be to
deepen donors' understanding of the political and
social factors moulding economic policy decisions.
How far donors are willing to listen, using dialogue to
further their understanding of the constraints and
objectives influencing the determination of policy,
varies from place to place and donor to donor.
Some donors have an ambiguous attitude towards
policy dialogue. They admit that they are trying to.
influence policy. At the same time they state that, of
course, the recipient is sovereign with a right to design
and implement its own policies.
Should donors conduct dialogue with one voice? Co-
ordinated leverage may appear practical where donors
agree about required policy reform, even in the fact of
recipient irritation. However, policy assessment is a
matter of doctrine and interest, over which donors can
well disagree, as well as of technical analysis about
which agreement might be hoped for. Donors differ in
the value they place on the free market and the private
sector, or on distributional objectives; and in their
geopolitical interests. Such diversity desirably increases
recipient options. It would be a mistake to gloss over
areas of legitimate doubt and policy difference.
Criticisms of the impact of aid which focus on the
dangers of excessive dependence highlight some of the
real dilemmas which arise when an aid programme
becomes important enough to provide the major
support of a development programme. There is an
attendant risk that the primary task of government
becomes the management of the aid relationship
rather than development. Then the key to personal
success is favourable location in relationship to aid
flows rather than productive performance in the
economy.
Aid can also act as an instrument to promote foreign
firms, as well as to bolster particular local commercial
interests. The concern articulated by aid critics and the
sympathy such criticism engenders within the
recipient countries reflects an understandable and
legitimate local concern about possible loss of
autonomy.
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Donors could well respond by recognising the dangers
of an unduly obtrusive, assertive role. Ultimately,
policy is more likely to be effective if it emerges from
an indigenous political process. There is a risk that
donors may shift the focus of policy discussion from
the domestic forum to the aid negotiation arena, so
that the resulting outcome is viewed as an external
imposition for which responsibility is not accepted.
Should donors coordinate in policy dialogue?
Recipients are naturally concerned about their
possible joint leverage.5 For example, the World
Bank, calling together and providing technical
support for donor consultative groups, might
orchestrate donor pressures for unwelcome policy
changes. Since the 'Berg Report' the Bank has pressed
for policy reforms about which many African
governments are so unenthusiastic that they can well
view Bank coordination of aid with some concern.
Nevertheless, the Bank has the virtue of independence
of any national commercial interest and is only
indirectly responsive to the political concerns of major
donors. And, by and large, consultative groups have
been low-key enough, and the donors independent
enough of any multilateral leadership, for concerted
donor pressures not to have developed as an explicit
feature of most aid relationships (see, however, Philip
Daniel's paper in this Bulletin).
With perennial financial crisis forcing so many least
developed countries to seek access to ¡MF facilities,
coordination between the IMF and aid agencies takes
on increasing interest. Suggestions for greater co-
ordination between the Fund and the Bank were
canvassed, for example by the US in the context of the
1985 Fund/Bank meeting in Seoul.
It is difficult to assess the IMF's past importance in
coordinating aid. By and large, the Fund negotiates
independently of third parties; yet it argues that the
'bill of health' provided by a Fund programme
increases across to other finance, including aid. The
corollary is that failure to agree with the Fund should
reduce such access. The World Bank, in particular,
Nurul Islam, having noted the potential benefits of a Bangladesh aid
consortium commented that: The fact that a consortium would be
likely to arrive at a common view about the strategies, policies and
priorities for development in Bangladesh, opened up the possibility
that more pressure would be exerted on her than if discussions were
to be undertaken mainly on a bilateral basis. Flexibility and
initiative would be lost ifit were necessary to enunciate, defend and
justify policies and priorities to a consortium. lt would no longer be
possible for Bangladesh to take advantage of the difference and
divergences in emphasis and approach which undoubtedly existed
among donors, particularly in relation to institutional and
constitutional matters. Once an economic forum was established,
the more aggressive and active donors would dominate and, unless
underlying differences were very strong, individual donors would
seldom stand out against the general view' EFaaland cd. 1981:22].
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would find it difficult to agree to programme finance,
for example structural adjustment lending, for a
member state in unresolved disagreement with the
Fund. In some instances, Fund support has lent
momentum to a major aid initiative (eg in Sri Lanka
following the advent of the Jayawardene admini-
stration). However, the extent and direction of
influence, as between the Fund on the one hand and
the Bank and bilateral donors on the other, is obscure;
Fund negotiations are confidential, and much inter-
agency consultation is informal.
Recent Tanzanian experience suggests some dangers
in an enhanced Fund role. Tanzania has been actively,
but unsuccessfully, negotiating with the Fund since
1981. Discussions have produced stalemate, with
Tanzania unwilling to accept IMF conditions and the
¡MF unwilling to fund Tanzania's programme. Many
substantive comments on adjustment issues are
available in the literature [see Green 1983; Van
Arkadie 1983; Helleiner 1983, 19851. Comment here is
limited to the dilemmas presented to donors by this
dispute.
Faced with a deep economic crisis resulting both from
policy mistakes and exogenous shocks, a recipient
clearly has to adjust policies, eg on exchange-rates,
budget, agricultural pricing, or key institutional
arrangements. Donors have a right to advocate reform
and a duty to examine their own performance.
A process of dialogue and policy reform was begun
with the IDA-financed Tanzanian Advisory Group
(1981-82) and the government's Structural Adjustment
Programme (1982), and extended in subsequent
budgetary, price policy and institutional measures.
However, the prospects for an improved incentive
system to work and for the budget to improve are very
limited, in the absence of external short-run balance-
of-payments finance for imported inputs and incentive
goods. The stalemate in the Fund negotiations has
therefore been a considerable hindrance.
Neither the Tanzanian government's policy adjust-
ments nor any other proposed policy package is
certain swiftly to restore growth and external balance,
The Fund's proposals, insofar as they are known,
seem unlikely to work in their own terms as a short-
term adjustment package, make no attempt to address
a number of key longer-term issues, and are seen as too
costly politically by the Tanzanian government.
Moreover, controversy engendered by the ¡MF
approach has almost certainly slowed down adjust-
ments, eg in the exchange rate, compared to what
would have been likely in the absence of dispute with
the Fund.
The World Bank has had its own agenda of reform and
dialogue, and its own areas of disagreement with
Tanzania, but in the areas of prime IMF responsibility
(notably the exchange rate) it has had to defer to the
Fund, even if the logic of its own analysis might lead to
different conclusions. Certainly the Bank could not be
seen as providing an alternative to the Fund. Thus it
has yet to mount a structural adjustment loan to
Tanzania.
The bilateral donors have gone along with the Fund in
urging Tanzania to accept a package on the Fund's
terms, although only the Dutch have gone to the
lengths of threatening to make their own lending
conditional on agreement with the Fund. Bilateral
donors presumably supported the Fund in part
because they agreed with elements of its package and
even found it convenient that the Fund should take on
the burden of pushing unpopular policy changes.
Certainly they were unready themselves to provide the
level of balance-of-payments support which would
have eliminated the need for a Fund programme.
Those donors, particularly the Scandinavians, who
saw themselves as having a long-term commitment to
Tanzania and were more sympathetic to the
predicament of the Tanzanian government (and more
optimistic regarding the policy trend) could not
influence the Fund to soften its stance - sometimes
because of the orthodoxy of their own Fund
representatives. Anyway, probably only the leverage
of its most powerful members is likely to shift the LMF
management.
In the event, the failure to agree with the IMF has yet
to result in any identifiable decline in bilateral
support; even the Dutch stand has yet to be reflected in
a decline in aid levels. Such erosion of support that has
occurred reflects a more general disappointment of the
great expectations which had generated such high aid
in the 1970s. To date the main financial cost of
stalemate has been lack of access to ¡MF funds and
slow progress towards Bank structural adjustment
lending. Nevertheless, it is a paradox that 'social-
democratic' countries mount programmes (and
concentrate on recipients) to pursue redistributive
objectives, yet accept Fund programmes destructive of
precisely those redistributive and social measures
which initially attracted those donors.
Tanzanian policy can certainly be faulted in the light
of the government's own stated goals, particularly in
relation to rural development. But much had been
achieved before the economic crisis (eg in relation to
education and health). Presumably those who
sympathised with the regime in the past should now be
exploring the means of restoring growth momentum
consistent with a renewed and realistic commitment to
egalitarian objectives. That would require something
quite different from an orthodox Fund programme,
the effectiveness of which is controversial. Donors do
not share the same priorities on development
objectives, nor the same evaluations of economic
policy instruments. The preference of donors as
revealed in their aid portfolios reflects, among other
things, differing views regarding development strategy.
While there is much to be said for greater co-
ordination and standardisation of the procedural
aspects of aid, there is little merit in the homogenisation
of donor views regarding policy, particularly when
this involves marshalling support for financial
orthodoxy.
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